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Banking institutions’ affinity to real estate is well reported however 
perhaps it’s more evidently so for banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). Despite the prevalence of GCC bank’s investing in real estate as a 
means of diversifying into non-lending activities and the natural reliance of 
asset-based Islamic banks to real estate, no research has directly tested the 
relationship between bank’s stability. The two research questions in this are: 
(1) Does bank’s real estate equity exposure affect its financial stability, and (2) 
Do Islamic banks’ real estate exposure have different risk effects than the real 
estate exposure of conventional banks? The study also adds further evidence 
on banks real estate loan exposure.  
The contribution of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, this is the first study 
to empirically investigate the relationship between bank’s real estate equity 
exposure and Islamic banks’ real estate exposure with financial stability using 
a panel data for the GCC. Second, this thesis extends the analysis by adopting 
the Z-score ratio and comprehensively control for bank specific factors which 
may affect financial stability as per the banking literature, something which 
the latter studies have failed to do so.  
Utilizing listed GCC banks balance sheet real estate debt and equity 
exposure, this study uses these indicators of real estate exposure to explain the 
fluctuation in banks financial stability, the Z-score. These data are obtained 
from BankScope and the footnotes of individual banks financial statements. 
This study also control for classic bank specific factors that can drive the 
fluctuations in Z-score. The relationship is modeled in a country fixed panel 
regression from 2007 to 2011. 
Empirical results show that banks real estate loan and equity exposure 
negatively affects financial stability. On the contrary, real estate exposure of 
Islamic banks has a positive relationship with financial stability. The results 
persist across different subsamples, subperiods and alternative risk measure. 
The asymmetric effect between Islamic and conventional bank real estate 
exposure may highlight the inherent differences in their business operation and 
ability to source for lower risk real estate assets.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 
Historically, the real estate exposure of banking institutions has been 
the interest of academicians and policy makers due to the invariable 
relationship between the two industries. Not barring the recent real estate 
induced crisis characterized by the shadow banking system, banking 
institutions have been an important source of funding for the real estate sector 
in many markets. This is especially the case for markets with high banking 
industry participation. In such instances, banks play a crucial part in providing 
the financing, which is the bloodline of the real estate sector. However, why 
do banks have exposure to real estate? One possible explanation suggested by 
Herring and Wachter (1999) is that banks perceive the profitability of real 
estate lending. Although the determinants of bank’s real exposure is not the 
focus of this thesis, however it should be noted that aside from creditor 
exposures, banks have also been known to invest directly in real estate as an 
avenue of diversifying into non-lending activities. While increased real estate 
lending has been observed to decrease financial stability in US banks (Blasko 
& Sinkey, 2006), similar evidence on bank’s real estate equity exposure and 
that of Islamic banks’ real estate exposure are not available
Background and Motivation 
1
                                                          
1 Eisenbis & Kwast (1991) is the only work to have found the viability of small to medium 
sized real estate banks having more than 40% real estate exposure. Also, Rahman (2010) is the 
only one to have studied the financing structure of Malaysian Islamic banks. She found that 
increased real estate lending of Islamic banks decreases their insolvency risk. However, 
Eisenbis & Kwast (1991) and Blasko & Sinkey (2006) only adopted a univariate framework 
while Rahman (2010) did not include a sample of conventional banks as control, neither 
works address bank’s equity investment in real estate. 
. Thus the Gulf 
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Cooperation Council (GCC) banking sector2
Thomas (2009) reported that Arab banks investment in global real 
estate surmount to more than USD 400 billion and similar amount or more 
may be held by the private wealth of Islamic investors. Hence real estate has 
traditionally been the preferred asset class among discerning Muslim investors 
and institutions. This was concurred by RREEF Research (2008) which found 
that favorable investment and regulatory environment to be crucial in 
supporting the growing appetite for real estate asset class among GCC 
institutional investors. On the Islamic finance sector front, the growth of 
Islamic banks since the 1960s has primarily been fueled by demand from 
Muslims and the abundant petrodollars in the Middle East. Today, Islamic 
banks still form the major asset share of the USD 1.3 trillion Islamic finance 
industry
 provides a natural test setting due 
to the prevalence of equity real estate investments by GCC banks and the 
coexistence of a vibrant Islamic banking market alongside conventional banks.  
3
                                                          
2 See Al-Hassan, Khamis & Oulidi (2010) and Al-Muharrami, Matthews & Khabari (2006) for 
a purview of GCC banking market.  
. Despite the rapid growth, due to the asset based nature of Islamic 
finance, recent years leading to the great financial crisis in 2007 have 
witnessed a surge in real estate investment and development by Islamic banks. 
PwC (2011) identified that many Islamic banks have a high exposure to real 
estate and that many Islamic products may be based on real estate assets. 
Wigglesworth (2009) in a Financial Times report identified many Islamic 
institutions to have relied heavily on real estate; by investing, developing and 
3 Islamic banks form 80% of all assets in the Islamic finance industry, the rest are dominated 
by mutual funds, investment companies and takaful (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). 
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lending around real estate4
On one hand theories have suggested that while diversifying into non-
lending activities may increase bank’s diversification, the latter itself may 
increase agency problems due to the increased difficulty from monitoring 
(Laeven & Levine, 2007). However it is not clear how real estate investing 
activities of banks will affect its financial soundness. Rosen et al. (1989), 
Sirmans (1984a, b)  and Boyd & Graham (1988) have indirectly looked at 
possibility of US banks diversifying into real estate investing, and have found 
it non feasible as they found little diversification benefits. On the other hand, 
Islamic banks function on two key principles: avoidance of interest, whether 
paid or receive and obligation to back any financial transaction with assets; all 
of which having to be validated by the opinion of a Shariah supervisory board 
comprising of Islamic scholars. Akin to the validating role played by auditors, 
the validated opinion of the Shariah board will ultimately serve to signal to 
investors/depositors that the products/transactions are Shariah compliant. Thus 
the Shariah board provides an additional layer of supervisory for investors. As 
such Islamic banks are only permitted to lend and invest in Shariah compliant 
real estate
. Hence the affinity of GCC banks (both 
conventional and Islamic) to real estate in a highly bank dependent economic 
region makes the study of the financial stability effects of real estate exposure 
more compelling.  
5. Despite the well documented real estate affinity of GCC banks6
                                                          
4 Islamic banks preferred habitat of investment into real estate has alerted PwC and Moody’s 
to question Islamic bank’s real estate risk. See PwC (2008) and Moody’s (2008). 
, 
5 See Ibrahim & Ong (2008), Ong et al. (2011), and Newell & Osmadi (2010) for literature on 
Shariah compliant real estate. 
6 The real estate affinity of Middle East financial institutions also extends to the prevalence of 
real estate mutual funds. For instance, Ibrahim & Ong (2008) documented how the flow of 
private Islamic real estate funds out of GCC in recent years amount to more than USD 1.8 
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no works have empirically explored the risk effects of their real estate 
exposure. Clearly the inherent characteristics of GCC banks inevitably call for 




 Despite the empirical evidence that increased real estate loan exposure 
reduces financial soundness of banks, no research has directly tested the risk 
effects of real estate equity and Islamic bank’s real estate exposure. This is due 
to the prevalence of conventional bank’s real estate debt exposure which has 
motivated the only similar previous works by Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) and 
Blasko & Sinkey (2006) in the US. To bridge this gap in the literature, this 
thesis seeks to study the GCC banking market which provides a natural test 
bed due to the prevalence of equity real estate investments amongst GCC 
banks and the presence of a vibrant Islamic banking sector. Therefore this 
thesis complements and extends previous empirical studies on real estate and 
banking for several specific reasons. Firstly, this is the first study to 
empirically investigate the relationship between bank’s real estate equity 
exposure and Islamic banks’ real estate exposure with financial stability using 
a panel data for the GCC. Second, previous cross sectional studies examining 
bank’s real estate exposure have used CAMELS Off-site Rating (SCOR) 
(Collier et al, 2003) and loan delinquency rate (Igan and Pinheira, 2010) as 
their dependent variables. This thesis extends the analysis by adopting the Z-
Research Focus and Contribution 
                                                                                                                                                        
billion. While Ernst & Young (2007) recorded how the average size of Islamic real estate fund 
grew from USD 55 million in 2002, to USD 189 million in 2006. 
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score ratio, which is a time variant measure of a bank’s distance to default as 
per Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) and Blasko & Sinkey (2006). More 
importantly, this study will comprehensively control for bank specific factors 
which may affect financial stability as per the banking literature, something 
which the latter two papers have failed to do so.  
The research questions which are of interest in this study are: (1) Does 
bank’s real estate equity exposure affect its financial soundness, and (2) Do 
Islamic banks’ real estate exposure have different risk effects than the real 
estate exposure of conventional banks? Bank’s diversification into non-
lending activities has spun theories which suggest bank’s engagement in 
multiple activities intensifies agency problems due to difficulty of monitoring. 
Thus, indirect empirical studies by Boyd & Graham (1988) and Rosen (1989) 
suggest little diversification benefits when banks venture into real estate 
business. However, they did not directly study balance sheet data of banks and 
their works are pertinent to US banks.  Examining the risk effects of GCC 
banks and its real estate exposure is important for several reasons. The GCC 
economic region is highly dependent on the banking sector, with banks assets 
amounting close to 100 % of GDP compared to only about 22% in the US (Al-
Hassan, Khamis & Oulidi, 2010; Herring & Wachter, 1999). Underlying that 
bank dependent economy, are financial institutions which have historically 
had a natural appetite for the real estate sector. Furthermore, the GCC has 
been the core centre of the Islamic finance sector which innately is also highly 
bank dependent. All in all, due to the high banking dependency of the GCC 
macro economy and the innate affinity of the banking sector to the real estate 
sector, the consequences of a potential real estate induced crisis may be 
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greater on the real economy. In the long term, the healthy growth of the 
Islamic finance sector as an increasingly popular alternative system in non-
Muslim majority countries is also contingent on the systemic stability of 
Islamic banks, the major players in the Islamic finance market. Thus 
understanding the risk effects of the real estate sector on banking sector 
stability will therefore be of great interest to policy makers in GCC and policy 
makers in non-GCC countries mulling the prospect of welcoming Islamic 
banking services to their shores. 
 
1.3 
This study uses aggregate balance sheet data from listed banks in the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) over the period 2007 to 2011. To measure 
the financial soundness of banks, this thesis employs the Z-score technique 
which is the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on asset 
(ROA) has to fall in order for the bank to become insolvent (Kunt & Huizinga, 
2010). It is constructed as the sum of mean ROA and mean equity-to-assets 
ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA. This metric has been 
extensively used in the banking literature thus a higher Z-score suggests a 
lower probability of bank insolvency. To measure a bank’s real estate 
exposure, this study employs two proxies: real estate debt and real estate 
equity. The real estate debt is the sum of real estate and construction loans 
expressed as a percentage of total loan portfolio size. Expressed in percentage, 
a higher real estate loan concentration implies a greater reliance of lending to 
the real estate sector. Also, the real estate equity concentration is the property 
Scope of Study and Research Design  
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investments amount divided by total investment portfolio size. Similarly, a 
higher real estate equity concentration ratio reflects greater exposure to real 
estate investments as a form of non-lending activity. Using Z-scores of all 
conventional and Islamic banks in the GCC as dependent variables, the 
computed real estate proxies are used to explain variations in a bank’s 
financial soundness over time.  
Utilizing a country-fixed effects panel regression model and while 
controlling for bank specific factors, this study provided direct empirical 
evidence that bank’s real estate equity exposure has a destabilizing effect. This 
suggest, banks diversifying into non-lending activities via real estate 
investment, face a cost of diversification (potentially from agency issues) 
which is greater than the benefits emanating from diversification.  On the 
contrary, both real estate debt and equity exposure of Islamic banks have a 
greater stabilizing effect than the real estate exposures of conventional banks. 
Specifically, higher levels of real estate debt and equity for Islamic banks 
predict higher Z-score, that is, greater financial soundness. The results may 
mirror Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) who found similar observation on the effect 
of real estate loan exposures in real estate banks (REB) in the US (defined as 
banks with more than 40% real estate loan exposure). That is, similarly to 
REB in the US, Islamic banks as a niche provider of capital may have a better 
ability in identifying high yielding and low risk real estate opportunities. This 
may highlight the additional risk management role that Shariah board in 
ensuring that real estate transactions complies with Islamic ethos. The risk 
effects of different real estate exposure on different type of banking 
institutions (Islamic vs. conventional) in the GCC suggest a reinforcing link 
 8 
 
that banks with an affinity to real estate sector has a direct effect on the 
systemic stability of the banking sector.  
The remaining chapter of this thesis is organized into six chapters. 
Chapter 2 is concerned with literature review on previous works that studies 
conventional bank exposure to real estate. The unique characteristics of 
Islamic banks are also highlighted. Chapter 3 provides data and methodology 
to be considered in the analysis process. Subsequently Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical findings while Chapter 5 presents some robustness tests. Chapter 6 





CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the following chapter, a broad summary of the relevant literature on 
real estate and banking markets that have been established by previous studies 
will be provided. The first section starts with fundamental issues and stylized 
facts about the real estate and banking market linkages. Subsequently, the 
viability of real estate as an avenue for banks diversifying into non-lending 
activities is examined. The third section provides an extensive discussion on 
the viability of bank’s holding real estate loans. Following that, a discussion 
on the similarities and differences between Islamic and conventional banking 
that may explain the results in this thesis. An attempt to account for the 
differential risk effects of Islamic and conventional bank real estate exposure 
is still a relatively new field. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief summary 




The relationship between the real estate and banking industry has 
traditionally captured the attention of academics and practitioners alike. The 
S&L crisis (1960s) and New England crash (1980s)  in the American 
economy, the Asian financial crisis (1997)  and the recent global subprime 
crisis (2007), all of which have invariably further fueled the attention on the 
relationship between the two industry. The perspective of that attention largely 
appears to be focused on the linkages between the real estate and banking 
macro economy; how the banking industry influences real estate and impact of 
The Link Between Banking & Real Estate Markets 
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real estate market conditions on the banking industry. In the light of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, Herring & Wachter (1999) seek to understand the 
relationship between real estate cycles and banking crisis. Utilizing a 
theoretical model, they found amongst other findings, the willingness of banks 
to increase their real estate lending is likely to increase to the extent that they 
are subject to disaster myopia. Moral hazard played a crucial role and as a 
result, the uncritical reliance on real estate collateral creates a false sense of 
security. When a real estate market bust is coupled by the bank’s forbearance, 
economies that rely on banks as a main source of financing will be severely 
impacted in terms of their investment and growth. In the same spirit, the 
extensive involvement of real estate in the 1980s New England banking bust, 
motivated Case et al. (2000) to explore the dimensions of the relationship 
between the real estate market and macroeconomic performance.  He 
documented that the volume of lending collateralized by real estate has grown 
sharply and this poses risk to the banking and financial sector. The author 
suggest that the rapid appreciation of the large residential market is driven by 
fundamentals and seem to imply the general consensus then, that is, 
commercial real estate loans are generally considered to be riskier than 
residential loans. This view later on became questionable when the residential 
subprime mortgages brought the global economy to its knees in 2007. 
 Works on how the banking industry shape the real estate market 
activity also attracted attention. Fergus & Goodman (1994) and Peek & 
Rosengren (1994), examine how reduced credit availability negatively impacts 
the real estate sector. As such, Hancock & Wilcox (1993) found that aggregate 
commercial bank credit flow reduces as conditions in real estate market 
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worsen. This further highlights the invariable dependency of banking 
institutions towards lending to the real estate market. Thus subsequent works 
seek to understand what determines banking institution level of real estate loan 
exposure. Using real estate loan amount as dependent variables, Hancock & 
Wilcox (1993, 1997)   found that real estate loan portfolio of banks decreases 
when banks have lower capital ratios and when face with worsened economic 
and real estate market conditions. In summary, due to the invariable link 
between the two industries, the real estate sector is susceptible to conditions 
which may reduce mortgage lending and construction, hence affecting the 
financing options for real estate. 
 
2.2 
However the focus of this research is closely linked to previous works 
that have explored the impact of real estate market conditions on the banking 
industry. Some of the works on this literature are motivated by banks 
expansion into nonbank activities such as real estate. It has been argued that 
permitting banks to expand into other lines of business will reduce their total 
risk through diversification. Johnson & Meinster (1974) and Brewer (1989) 
found reasonable diversification benefits for banks to diversify into non-
lending activities which include investment banking and real estate. However, 
Laeven and Levine (2007) argued that banks diversifying into non-lending 
activity may actually intensify agency problems due to the difficulty in 
monitoring varied activities. Analyzing banks from 43 countries over a five 
year period from 1998 to 2002, they found banks with diversified income and 
Bank’s Equity Exposure to Real Estate 
 12 
 
business are penalized by the market through lower market valuations due to 
the perceived agency problems. They found clear evidence that diversification 
into non-lending activities penalizes banks because the cost of diversification 
(agency problem from difficulty in monitoring) outweighs the benefits of 
diversification. Similarly, Boyd & Graham (1988) found that combining banks 
and non-lending activities would increase the probability of bankruptcy of 
such banks7
Allen et al. (1995) found that it was common for commercial banks to 
take equity positions in commercial real estate. Rosen et al. (1989) and 
Sirmans (1984a, b) are among the first few empirical work to have studied the 
benefits of banks direct investment in real estate. Rosen et al. (1989) take a 
portfolio approach to the question of bank’s equity real estate exposure. This 
study differs from Sirmans (1984a, b) by finding the level of real estate 
investment (as an equity partner) that can be tolerated by a bank without a 
reduction in the risk, as measured by the variance of bank’s earnings. They 
sought to determine the optimal weight of real estate investment, measured as 
a percentage of total assets, in a two-security portfolio that does not alter the 
variance of the portfolio. Using REIT data as a proxy, there appear to be 
modest benefits to diversification up to a level of four percent of the total 
portfolio. Unlike the indirect approach of the previous work, Allen et al. 
(1995) directly investigated the balance sheet exposure of commercial banks 
to the real estate market because they found it is increasingly common for US 
commercial banks to take equity positions in real estate. Using monthly data 
.  
                                                          
7 Johnson & Meinster  (1974) and Brewer (1989) found conflicting results because the 
analysis is dependent on asset mix, proxy used and time period.  
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from 1979 to 1992, they adopted the two factor asset pricing model of bank 
stock return and added a third, real estate variable factor which is proxy using 
NAREIT Equity REIT Index. They found that aside from market and interest 
rate factor, banks stock returns are also sensitive to the real estate market; in 
fact this sensitivity has increased over the years since 1987. Subsequently, 
they used the real estate coefficients for each bank (125 banks) from the asset 
pricing model, and regress it against a bank’s equity and creditor exposure to 
real estate. Using balance sheet data, the former is proxy using amount of real 
estate investment while the latter is amount real estate loans; both as 
percentage of total capital. The cross sectional regression suggest that each of 
the real estate exposure variable is significantly positive but their effects on 
bank’s returns are not likely identical. Hence, these authors conclude that, at 
best, there is modest potential for diversification benefits from allowing banks 
to invest directly in real estate and that bank’s real estate sensitivity is related 
to its equity positions in real estate.  
What is not definitive is that, there is no attempt to directly identify the 
impact that bank real estate equity has on bank’s stability by analyzing balance 
sheet real estate equity exposure to financial soundness. Also, the time period 
of previous study may not be inclusive of periods of crisis which may explain 
some of the conflicting findings on non-lending activities. Lastly, studies on 
bank’s real estate equity exposure lack a comprehensive analysis in a 
multivariate framework that is able to control for other bank specific factors. 
The shortfall in studies on bank’s equity real estate exposure is also due to the 
prevalence of bank’s creditor exposure to real estate, which will be explained 




Unlike the previous works on bank’s equity exposure to real estate 
which is sparse, the literature on creditor exposure to real estate is more 
thoroughly researched. In this section the previous works are presented based 
on the prevalent methodology adopted. In studying bank’s creditor exposure to 
real estate, authors have generally either applied time series methods or cross 
sectional analysis. Amongst the earlier cross sectional study, Eisenbeis & 
Kwast (1991) motivated by the S&L crisis, seek to investigate the viability of 
a specialized real estate bank, which by definition has more than 40% of its 
loans to the real estate sector. Using annual balance sheet and income 
statement data from 1978 to 1988, they stratify their samples into real estate 
specialized banks (REB) and conventional banks (CB), the latter being a 
control group. Adopting a univariate approach and utilizing bank specific 
variables from their financial statements, the authors found REB that are small 
to medium sized are economically viable. In fact REB that were in business 
for a longer time period had higher returns with less risk than substantially 
more diversified commercial banks. They concluded that the higher return of 
REB is due to their higher proportion of real estate loans while their lower risk 
is due to their ability in identifying high-yielding, low risk lending 
opportunities
Bank’s Creditor Exposure to Real Estate 
8
                                                          
8 Although this finding is congruent to other works such as Eisenbis & Kwast (1982) and 
Eisenbeis (1982), however previous works choice of time period chosen for analysis questions 
their findings. This is because prior research did not account time periods where the real estate 
market was facing a downward cycle. Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) analysis deals with these 
concerns by incorporating time period when the real estate market was less than healthy. 
.  On the contrary, similar work by Blasko & Sinkey (2006) 
found REB to be unviable. While both authors adopted a univariate framework 
on a sample of US banks, however they differ in the time period of analysis. 
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Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) sample started from 1978 to 1988 while Blasko & 
Sinkey (2006) covered from 1989 to 2006. While both studies utilized an 
extensive time period, neither included a time when the real estate market is 
facing a severe down market9
The works by Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) and Blasko & Sinkey (2006) 
reflects how over the years banks have increased their real estate loan 
exposure. However with the onset of some real estate induced crisis, the 
concept of a bank’s real estate risk (sensitivity) was put into question. Collier 
et al. (2003) develop a Real Estate Stress Test (REST) model in order to 
identify banks that are potentially at risk in the event of a real estate crisis. 
Using the New England bank data from 1987 and 1990, they modeled bank’s 
1990 balance sheet variables against a set of 1987 balance sheet data. The 
dependent variables chosen are based on Statistical CAMELS Off-site Rating 
(SCOR) which represents the condition of banks in 1987 before the New 
England real estate crisis in 1990. They identified high levels of commercial 
real estate loans in 1987 and high asset growth between 1985 and 1987 were 
associated with poor performance in 1990. Recently, following the 2007 
subprime crisis debacle, researchers have revisited this issue, albeit with a 
more noble intention of identifying vulnerable banks that have creditor 
exposure to real estate.  Koetter & Poghosyan (2010) examine impact of 
regional housing price on bank stability in Germany via two competing 
hypothesis. On one hand is the collateral value hypothesis which suggests that 
increasing real estate prices enhance bank stability and a negative relation 
. Thus in this study, this thesis ensures the time 
period chosen will cover a down cycle of the real estate market.  
                                                          
9 The New England crash in the 1980s affected mostly New England banks while the Asian 
Financial Crisis mostly affected Asian banks. 
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between nominal house price changes and the bank’s probability of default. 
On the other hand, the deviation hypothesis suggests that larger departures of 
house prices from their fundamental value increases the bank’s probability 
default. They found statistical and economic significance for the deviation 
hypothesis. Hence they suggested that deviation from fundamental value of 
real estate is an important factor when assessing bank stability, rather than just 
price changes alone. Also, Igan & Pinheira (2010) analyze banks exposure to 
the real estate sector prior to the 2007 financial crisis. By determining factors 
that influenced loan delinquency rate and by adopting a stress test approach, 
they propose a cross section analysis to identify vulnerable banks. They 
documented over the years, banks loan portfolio secured by real estate has 
steadily risen. However, the increase in exposure is driven by residential 
mortgage and home equity loans while commercial real estate loans has been 
relatively stable. Using quarterly data from 1987 to 2006, they identified 
banks with high real estate loans; rapid loan growth and high cost income ratio 
are more likely to be affected by the crisis in 2007. 
While the cross sectional studies help to determine the impact real 
estate loan exposure has on bank specific characteristics, the subsequent time 
series works have mainly served to determine a bank’s return sensitivity to the 
real estate stock market. Mei & Saunders (1995) investigate how does bank’s 
real estate exposure affected the ex ante pricing of risk in bank stock prices. 
Using monthly bank and REIT data from 1970 to 1989, they found that bank’s 
exposure to real estate risk is time varying. Regressing excess returns of bank 
stocks against a set of regressors (such as January effect and interest rate risk), 
they found that only smaller non money center banks has a positive significant 
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real estate risk premium (proxy by real estate cap rate). This real estate 
premium on bank’s stock pricing has become more sensitive since the 1980s 
when banks started to increase their real estate loans. Similarly, motivated by 
banking firms increased exposure to real estate in their loan portfolio, He et al. 
(1996) seek to investigate the sensitivities of banks to various real estate 
mortgage categories by adopting a three factor model10
                                                          
10 The three factor model is a common addendum to the two factor bank asset pricing formula. 
The factors are market returns, interest rates and sub sequentially real estate market return. 
The contention in the literature is usually in choosing the right proxy for each of these factors 
in order to determine a bank’s exposure to real estate. 
. They adopted six 
different real estate proxies and tested the hypothesis if the real estate 
sensitivity coefficients differ for different mortgage categories. They found 
that bank stock returns are more sensitive to mortgage REIT returns than 
equity REIT. Their result suggests that banks are more likely to have creditor 
exposure to real estate rather than equity. Also, banks with larger portion of 
total loans in construction and development loans, one to four family 
residential loans, five or more family residential loan, nonresidential real 
estate loans and total real estate loans are more sensitive to changes in real 
estate returns (proxy by MREIT). Hence they manage to identify MREIT as a 
more suitable real estate proxy and also the relationship between mortgage 
default risk and the specific real estate investment underlying the loan. 
Recently, Elyasiani et al. (2010) deviated from conventional bank factor 
models used in the past and adopted a bivariate GARCH analysis to examine 
the real estate risk effects on banks returns. They examine the return and 
volatility of financial institutions with the real estate sector. Using monthly 
data from 1972 to 2004, they found that real estate is statistically and 
economically significant in explaining financial institution return. The effect 
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of real estate is positive, with the impact greatest for institutions with largest 
exposure to real estate loans. Hence they concluded this warrant for increased 
attention by banks and bank regulators as well as borrowers and depositors. 
Thus far all the mentioned studies of banks real estate exposure has been 
focused on the US and Europe (Germany) market. After the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC), attentions turn to Asian banks and their real estate 
exposure. Lu & So (2005) studies the relationship between listed banks and 
real estate firms in seven Asian economies before and after the AFC. Since 
Asian banks lending activity is concentrated in the real estate sector, they 
adopted a three factor model to test the sensitivity of bank stock return to real 
estate sector. Using daily data from 1995 to 1999, they authors constructed a 
value weighted return on real estate portfolio by using publicly traded real 
estate companies as proxy. All Asian banks returns are positively significant to 
the real estate sector, with Hong Kong banks being the most sensitive owing to 
the large percentage of real estate loans and large market cap of Hong Kong 
real estate firms. Only in Malaysia, are bank stock returns an inverse function 
of real estate market returns. The impact of real estate market is consistent pre 
and posts the AFC crisis, but the sensitivity increased after the crisis. This 
suggests that even after the crisis, the hidden risk of real estate collateral on 
the bank lending process was explicit and recognized. 
 
2.4 
Empirical studies comparing Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional 
banks (CBs) are scarce but have been on a steady rise, largely owing to the 
Islamic Banking versus Conventional Banking 
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prominence of the Islamic finance sector in the past decade. As more non 
Muslim majority countries adopt Islamic finance, the interest to understand 
Shariah compliant vehicles and institutions is increasing. As financial 
intermediaries, IBs play similar roles in the economy as CBs. Namely they 
make the financial markets work by moving funds from depositors to parties 
with productive investment opportunities. Because the real estate sector is a 
capital intensive business, banks have been a traditional source of funds for 
real estate projects, especially in the GCC. In addition, both IBs and CBs aid 
the address of asymmetric information between depositors and borrowers of 
funds, reduce transaction cost through economies of scale and diversify the 
risk of depositors by having a credit portfolio of varied exposures (Mishkin, 
2006).  
However the prime difference is that IBs operate in accordance with 
the rules of Shariah, the legal code in Islam. As such, five ethos guide Islamic 
banking intermediary: ban on interest, ban on uncertainty and speculation, ban 
on unlawful sectors, obligation to share profits and losses and obligation to 
back any financial transaction with assets. Despite these guidelines, Moody’s 
reported that IBs and CBs are essentially similar in the business they operate, 
that is, raising funds and allocating them to a range of assets through credit 
exposures11
                                                          
11 Aside from the Islamic ethos that guide Islamic banking intermediary, the main difference 
between IBs and CBs is on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.  
. As a result Beck, Kunt and Merrouche (2010) found little 
evidence that IBs and CBs are any different in terms of their business 
orientation, efficiency, asset quality and cost-effectiveness. The prime 
evidence in their work is that IBs are found to be more capitalized than CBs. 
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This is concurred by Hasan and Dridi (2010) who found IBs to have a 
defensive characteristics compared to CBs, during the 2008-09 crisis due to its 
higher equity base. While it is not the main objective purpose of this thesis to 
provide a full purview between IBs and CBs, however it is important within 
the context of the study to appreciate how the two entities real estate exposure 
could differ and thus potentially influencing the results.  
As with any banking institutions, deposits are liabilities and thus banks 
have to channel deposits by creating a credit portfolio (assets) by lending to 
businesses and consumers to attain a higher rate of return on funds. In terms of 
the credit portfolio, IBs do not materially differ from CBs. Though IBs 
intermediation is largely known as equity based, however in reality on the 
asset side most IBs financing is in the form of Murabaha contracts (cost plus 
financing)12
                                                          
12 The exact Islamic financing structure used for real estate loans cannot be determined from 
most of the bank’s financial statements. However, Ibrahim & Ong (2008) in an interview of 
over 28 Islamic finance expert found; Ijara (83%), Sukuk (75%) and Murabaha (58%) as the 
preferred Islamic financing method for real estate. Their sample only included 9 banks, thus 
the majority of the answers are driven by non-bank Islamic institutions. Nonetheless, 
prominence of Murabaha contracts in banks credit portfolio is a well documented observation 
as per Hasan & Dridi (2010) and Chong & Liu (2009). 
.  Thus barring everything else, a real estate loan handed out by 
IBs should carry the same credit risk as that of CBs. However, due to the 
requirement of Shariah compliance, IBs are not permissible to extend real 
estate loans to projects which contain unlawful practices. Thus financing 
commercial development with conventional financial institutions as tenants, 
liquor business and hotels may not be permissible. Also on the asset sides, IBs 
build an investment portfolio just like CBs. According to Moody’s, generally 
bulk of CBs portfolio is made of fixed income securities due to asset liability 
management purposes. On the contrary, due to the shortage of Sukuk (Islamic 
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bonds), IBs investment portfolio tend to comprise of riskier and volatile assets 
such as equities and properties. Similarly for IBs, the type of property it is 
allowed to invest is governed by Shariah requirements. Aside from the 
screening criteria applicable to IBs real estate loan and investment, IBs have a 
greater reliance on assets to back its transactions. The asset-based nature of 
Islamic intermediation is meant to place IBs closer to the real economy 
compared to CBs who may just structure products that are mainly notional or 
virtual within an infinite range (Hasan & Dridi, 2010). It should be noted that 
the role of the Shariah board is not to specifically identify the economic 
viability of the project (this still lies with the managers). Instead the role of the 
Shariah board is to ensure any real estate transactions of Islamic banks are 
lawful in the eye of Islamic law. Any suspicions of speculation or uncertainty 
may render the transaction void by the board. Hence, this study seeks to 
investigate if it may be plausible that the additional layer of supervision may 
help reduce moral hazard inherent in bank managers as highlighted by Herring 
& Wachter (1999). This additional monitoring may aid in ensuring the real 
estate exposure of Islamic banks adhere to Islamic ethos as closely as possible, 
which may result in better risk management practice.     
 
2.5 
Generally, the relationship between real estate and banking industry 
has inspired various studies and highlighted several issues for policy makers. 
The two issues which are the focus of this thesis are: real estate equity 




Despite significant variations in hypotheses, empirical models and data, much 
of the existing empirical literature acknowledges the potential risk of banks 
with high real estate loan exposure. Eisenbis & Kwast (1991) is the only one 
to have found the viability of having real estate banks despite its high real 
estate exposure. The same cannot be said for bank’s real estate equity 
exposure as there is lack of comprehensive study on the subject matter. Allen 
et al. (1995) is the only formal work to have looked at bank’s balance sheet 
real estate equity however they did not investigate financial soundness and did 
not control for bank specific factor. Equivalent literature on Islamic banks is 
also non-existent.   
Therefore, this study uses a set of listed GCC bank data because of the 
natural affinity of GCC banks to real estate. The prevalence of real estate 
equity in GCC banks allows for a timely look at its effects on bank’s stability. 
The GCC banking industry also contains a substantial share of the Islamic 
banking industry. Naturally, it provides a test setting to investigate the Shariah 
real estate exposure of Islamic banks. By studying their balance sheet 
exposure to real estate, this allows for a direct examination of the dynamic 





CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 
To test the hypothesis that real estate exposure affects bank’s financial 
stability, this thesis adopts an unbalanced panel regression with country-fixed 
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity across GCC countries. To 




𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + �𝛽kXk,𝑖,𝑡




where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 represents the Z-score ratio as the proxy for risk (financial 
stability). 𝑅𝐸_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the real estate debt exposure proxy by real estate loan 
concentration and 𝑅𝐸_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the real estate equity exposure proxy by 
property investment (as a percentage of total investment). Xk,𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of 
bank specific control variables and finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the residual. To specifically 
answer the first research question, the sign of 𝛽2 will give an indication if real 
estate equity exposure of banks contribute to financial stability. A positive 
sign will support diversification theory while (higher z-score indicates greater 
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financial stability) a negative sign will suggest agency problem from 
monitoring non-lending activity.  
  
In order to answer the second research question on Islamic bank real 
estate exposure, the following model will be estimated: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸_𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐵_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦+ 𝛽4(𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡)+ 𝛽5(𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + �𝛽kXk,𝑖,𝑡+ �𝛽jCountry dummies + �𝛽hTime dummies+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(2) 
where 𝐼𝐵_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 is a dummy variable for the type of bank (1 denoting an 
Islamic bank, 0 otherwise). (𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡) and (𝐼𝐵𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∗
𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡) are the interactions between the respective real estate exposures 
with the type of bank. A positive sign on 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 will suggest that the real 
estate exposure of Islamic banks contribute positively to financial stability and 
supports the plausibility that Shariah advisory provides additional risk 






As a measure of bank risk, this thesis uses the Z-Score as a proxy for 
financial stability. The Z-Score is denoted as follows: 
Measure of Financial Stability 





where CAP denotes a ratio of bank equity capital to total assets (capital ratio), 
ROA denotes return-to-assets (profitability) and ROASTD is the volatility of 
ROA (return volatility). Thus the Z-Score increases with bank’s profitability 
and capital ratio but decreases as return volatility increases. As a common 
metric in the banking literature, the Z-Score measures the probability of 
insolvency when the value of assets becomes lower than the value of debt 
(Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009). Therefore a lower (higher) Z-Score indicates a 
higher (lower) probability of insolvency risk.  
 
3.3 
The key variables in this study are meant to measure the extent of each 
bank’s real estate exposure. This thesis focuses on direct balance sheet real 
estate exposure as per Allen et al. (1994). Thus, banks in the sample can lend 
to real estate sector in their credit portfolio and invest in property as part of 
their investment portfolio. 
Measure of Real Estate Exposure 
Data for real estate loan exposures are obtained from the footnotes of 
the financial statements while real estate equity is from balance sheet. Real 
estate debt is estimated by amount of loans made to real estate and 
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construction sector divided by total credit portfolio. In all the GCC countries 
(except Qatar), the real estate loan proxy may include both residential and 
commercial (Al-Hassan, Khamis & Oulidi, 2010). In the case of Qatar, 
residential loans are lumped into consumer loans. Hence, real estate loans in 
Qatar might be understated and also due to lack of data disclosure this study 
could not separate the effects of residential vis-à-vis commercial loans; we 
treat them collectively to represent overall loan to the real estate sector. On the 
other hand real estate equity investment amount is the direct property 
investment portfolio divided over the total investment portfolio. Generally 
from Figure 1, we observe that Islamic banks in the GCC carry greater real 
estate exposure than conventional banks. This highlights the asset based nature 
of Islamic intermediary and is a testament to the attention highlighted by 
industry practitioners regarding Islamic banks real estate concentration risk. 
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Past works that have studied banking institutions real estate exposure 
have failed to comprehensively analyze the issue due to two factors. One, the 
only similar works by Eisenbeis & Kwast (1991) and Blasko & Sinkey (2006) 
have only adopted a univariate approach. Second, Allen et al. (1994) though 
directly analyzed bank’s balance real estate exposure did not control for other 
alternative explanations that may affect a bank’s financial stability. In this 
thesis, we address both concerns by adopting a multivariate framework and by 
controlling for bank specific variables. Notes on variables and data sources are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
Control Variables 
A bank’s financial stability may also be affected by the quality of its 
assets and operational efficiency. Hence as per Uhde & Heimeshoff (2009), 
this study controls for LOAN_LOSS_PROVISION and 
COST_INCOME_RATIO. The latter measures the quality of the credit 
portfolio, hence a higher (lower) loan loss provision amount implies lower 
(higher) asset quality, and hence we could expect a negative relationship with 
financial stability. That is, higher loan loss provision will reduce the Z-Score, 
thus decreases financial stability. The former measures the operational 
efficiency of banks hence we can similarly expect a negative relationship with 
financial stability. To control for bank’s level of diversification this thesis 
controls for ASSET_DIVERSITY and INCOME_DIVERSITY as per Laeven 
& Levine (2007). Based on diversification theories, banks with greater 
diversity of income and assets should have lower risk, however an increased 
cost of diversification due to monitoring and agency problems will increase 
the risk of banks with a diversified business. Finally we control for size and 
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capital ratio of banks using ASSETS and EQUITY_ASSETS_RATIO. As per 
Demsetz & Strahan (1997), large banks should have lower risk because they 
are more capable of diversifying risk. Furthermore, larger banks have better 
access to capital markets which implies they have better flexibility to cope 
with unexpected liquidity shortfalls. Hence, bank size should be negatively 
related to risk. Also as per Acharya, Hassan & Saunders (2002), banks with 






CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 
Table 1 reports the characteristics of GCC banks from 2007 to 2011. 
Both real estate proxies suggest that lending and investing in real estate has 
increased especially for Islamic banks.  This reflects the greater dependency 
on real estate among Islamic banks. Across the sample period, conventional 
banks (CBs) consistently have higher Z-Score than Islamic banks (IBs). Hence 
similar to Cihak & Hesse (2008), this study found IBs to have a higher 
propensity to fail than CBs. This reflects the inherent challenges that IBs faced 
in terms of risk management. According to Moody’s due to the nascent 
Islamic bond market, IBs face greater challenge in managing their liquidity 
and maturity mismatches. Hence, real estate assets form a larger percentage of 
IBs investment portfolios.     
Descriptive Statistics 
Also align with other documented studies on IBs, Table 1 suggest that 
IBs are more capitalized and diversified. The higher asset diversity for IBs 
suggests greater reliance on non-loan earning assets such as securities and real 
estate investments. Despite a higher capital ratio and greater diversification, 
the lower Z-score in IBs can plausibly be explained by its lower operational 
efficiency, smaller size. Looking at Table 2, the correlation between real estate 
debt and real estate equity is 0.187, which means they are measuring different 
aspects of real estate exposure. Both are also negatively related with Z-score (-
0.234, -0.176). Since in this thesis, the concern is whether banks real estate 
exposure can explain the fluctuations in the financial stability of banks, hence 
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subsequent section will attempt to answer this in a univariate and multivariate 
setting.   
  
Table 1: Summary statistics of GCC banks from 2007 to 2011 
 
  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All banks 51 52 54 54 53
Islamic 18 18 19 19 18
Conv 33 34 35 35 35
Re Loan Concentration (avg %)
Islamic 22.92 25.04 31.73 30.41 30.46
Conv 15.89 17.05 17.40 16.16 16.47
Re Equity Concentration (avg %)
Islamic 17.82 18.67 21.65 20.26 22.90
Conv 2.48 3.39 3.53 3.89 2.93
Z Score (avg)
Islamic 17.83 13.99 16.09 12.80 11.92
Conv 34.48 26.36 26.64 27.86 27.84
Equity/Total Assets (avg %)
Islamic 23.67 19.37 21.77 18.62 18.53
Conv 12.83 12.96 14.22 14.98 15.26
Total Assets (avg %) (USD'000)
Islamic $8,327,145 $10,154,710 $10,441,685 $11,959,558 $13,769,070
Conv $18,696,449 $20,582,542 $21,631,086 $22,749,727 $24,593,587
Cost to Income Ratio (avg %)
Islamic 39.41 38.70 54.68 60.41 52.54
Conv 30.21 34.75 33.79 33.40 34.03
Income Diversity (avg)
Islamic 79.80 72.32 44.00 41.75 61.30
Conv 79.83 50.89 61.19 59.68 57.54
Asset Diversity (avg)
Islamic 82.96 77.64 82.76 77.13 78.51
Conv 67.42 56.58 60.66 63.82 62.74
Loan Loss Provision (avg)(USD'000)
Islamic $18,932 $74,115 $108,992 $95,136 $109,371
Conv $30,973 $107,119 $200,974 $175,628 $165,847
Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
  
















Z_SCORE -0.234*** -0.176*** 1
ASSET_DIVERSITY 0.256*** -0.092 -0.111* 1
ASSETS -0.235*** -0.097 0.084 -0.145** 1
COST_TO_INCOME_RATIO 0.193*** 0.187*** -0.231*** 0.337*** -0.269*** 1
EQUITY_TOTAL_ASSETS 0.330*** 0.062 0.129** 0.329*** -0.329*** 0.210*** 1
INCOME_DIVERSITY -0.145** -0.061 0.013 0.214*** 0.060 -0.100 -0.031 1
LOAN_LOSS_PROVISION -0.030 0.029 -0.140** -0.198*** 0.626*** -0.113* -0.274*** -0.057 1




The empirical analysis in this study focuses on the potential effects on 
financial stability caused by: real estate equity and Islamic bank’s Shariah real 
estate exposure. Univariate analysis are first carried out to examine the 
relationship between financial stability and its explanatory factors with a focus 
on real estate debt and real estate equity before expanding to a multivariate 
framework. Table 3 shows the mean values of banks Z-score by classifying 
them into different subgroups. In the first row of Table 3 we observe that it is 
statistically significant that CBs have a greater financial stability than IBs. In 
the second and third row, banks are classified as having higher real estate 
exposure if its real estate loan and equity is greater than the average exposure. 
It can be observed that banks with higher real estate loan and equity have 
lower financial stability. Because the univariate setting may mask some 
unseen relationships, the following section seeks to address the issue in a 
multivariate framework.  
Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3: Univariate test of Z-scores 
  
Conventional Banks Islamic Bank
28.58 14.52 14.05***
<avg RE Loan >avg RE Loan
29.26 17.29 11.97***
<avg RE Equity >avg RE Equity
30.63 21.77 8.86***
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
The average Z-score of banks are compared by segregating them into varied
groups. The first row, banks are segregated based on bank type. In second
and third row, banks are group based on their level of real estate exposure




Results of the estimation of the panel regression model are contained 
in Table 4, with all models using Z-Score as the dependent variable. 
Regression (1) provides evidence which concurs with the findings of Blasko & 
Sinkey (2006), that is controlling for all other factors
Z-Score & Real Estate Exposure 
13
By means of regression (4) – (6), we aim to answer the second research 
question in this thesis. The negative coefficient on IB_DUMMY reflects the 
current underlying situation that IBs have lower Z-Score than CBs due to its 
inadequate risk management practices
; banks with high real 
estate loan exposure have lower financial stability. This is largely due to the 
credit risk pertinent in a real estate loan portfolio. Regression (2) answers the 
first research question in this thesis. The negative coefficient on real estate 
equity suggests that banks which delve into real estate as a form of non-
lending business activity actually increases their risk of insolvency. This 
suggest that diversifying into non-lending business like real estate may 
actually increase the difficulty of monitoring, hence banks face a cost of 
diversification that most likely outweighs the benefits of diversifying. 
Regression (3) aims to robustly test the effect of real estate exposures jointly 
and here we observe that both real estate coefficients remain significant.  
14
                                                          
13 While the GCC oil producing nations are relatively similar in their macroeconomic set-up, I 
also control for cross country differences with regard to the macroeconomic environment. 
Additional time variant country specific factors included: GDP per capita growth, inflation, 
index of economic freedom (by Heritage Foundation) and 5 largest bank concentrations. The 
results are qualitatively the same hence I report results without these time variant country 
specific factors 
. As aforementioned, one of the key 
14 Although the development of Islamic equivalent risk management instruments has advanced 
leaps and bounds, PwC (2008) found risk management has not been uppermost on Islamic 
banking sector’s agenda in recent years. This is largely due to the focus on growth and 
continous struggle to innovate and compete alongside conventional banks.  
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risk management issue faced by IBs is that they have fewer Islamic bond and 
liquid hedging instruments to manage their liquidity and handle their maturity 
mismatches. Although the recent implosion of the Sukuk market and 
introduction of Islamic repo market has begun, the risk management capability 
of IBs still fall short that of CBs. Hence we observe that IBs have greater 
tendency to hold real estate in their investment portfolio (due to shortage of 
liquid Islamic bond instruments) and hold greater equity capital, because they 
are technically less flexible in managing liquidity shortfalls vis-à-vis CBs.  
Turning to the Shariah real estate exposure of IBs, we see that contrary 
to CBs, the real estate exposure of IBs does not decrease the financial stability 
of IBs as CBs do. This suggests that higher concentration of Shariah real estate 
debt and equity improves the financial stability of IBs, which concurs with 
Rahman (2010) who found similar finding for the real estate loan of Malaysian 
IBs.  Two explanations may explain this observation. Firstly, this implies that 
contrary to CBs, IBs as a niche provider of capital may be akin to real estate 
banks in Eisenbis & Kwast (1991). That is, it is plausible that IBs could have 
better ability in identifying high yielding and low risk real estate opportunities. 
This expertise could arise owing to the asset-based nature of Islamic banking 
operations which causes a natural affinity towards the real estate sector. As 
such IBs managers may have better expertise in managing their credit risk 
(real estate loans) and real estate risk (real estate investments). Secondly, 
specifically in IBs case, due to the extra supervision of the Shariah board, IBs 
managers have to engage in real estate assets which are Shariah compliant. It 
is possible that the additional risk management role that Shariah board plays 
ensures that IBs real estate transactions comply with Islamic ethos. Therefore, 
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these two reasons could account for why the positive coefficients of IBs real 
estate exposure are contrary to the negative coefficients in CBs real estate 
exposure. 
The signs for all control variables are also coherent with the expected 
signs from the literature. The negative coefficient in ASSET DIVERSITY, 
concurs the finding with real estate equity, that is, increased diversification 
into non-lending business increases the risk of banking institutions. Similarly, 
banks with poor quality assets are more likely to have greater insolvency risk. 
On the contrary, as per Demsetz & Strahan (1997) larger banks are more 
financially stable because of its ability to manage liquidity shortfalls as 
compared to smaller banks. Similarly, banks with higher capital ratio have 
lower probability of insolvency risk. Hence after controlling for bank specific 
variables, the results suggest: real estate equity increases insolvency risk but 




Table 4: Z-score regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
RE_Loan -0.468*** -0.429*** -0.717*** -0.640***
(0.129) (0.125) -0.220 (0.218)
RE_Invest -0.225*** -0.182*** -0.387*** -0.220*
(0.064) (0.054) (0.128) (0.116)






Asset Diversity -0.053 -0.124*** -0.065 -0.093** -0.106** -0.100**
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
Total Assets 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost to Income Ratio -0.12** -0.107** -0.084 -0.045 -0.029 -0.037
(0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046)
Equity/Total Assets 0.653** 0.497** 0.655*** 0.729*** 0.728*** 0.755***
(0.258) (0.23) (0.248) (0.204) (0.202) (0.203)
Income Diversity -0.031 -0.012 -0.029 -0.018 -0.006 -0.014
(0.028) (0.03) (0.029) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019)
Loan Loss Provisions -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 33.22*** 31.09*** 34.34*** 37.17*** 26.09*** 36.52***
(7.418) (6.505) (7.276) (7.414) (6.046) (7.518)
Country Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
Adjusted R-Squared 0.265 0.232 0.283 0.340 0.306 0.342




Although the Z-score is commonly used in the banking literature, it is 
essentially an accounting based measure. In order to develop the literature, this 
section seeks to test if real estate exposure of banks affects its systematic risk, 
Beta, which is a market based risk metric
Alternative Risk Measure 
15
Regression (1) – (3) in Table 5 provides additional evidence to the 
literature regarding real estate loan exposure of banking institutions. The 
positive coefficient on real estate loan enters at 5% significance suggesting 
that banks with higher real estate loans have higher systematic risk. This could 
be attributed to the credit risk inherent in a real estate loan portfolio. Similarly, 
the positive coefficient of real estate equity enters at 5% significance in 
regression (2). This also suggests that banks with higher real estate investment 
portfolio have greater systematic risk which may emanate from the real estate 
market risk inherent in a real estate equity portfolio. In regression (4) – (6) the 
positive coefficient on IB_Dummy also highlights that IBs have greater 
systematic risk than CBs over the sample period. The higher risk of IBs 
concurs with earlier findings on Z-score. Despite having greater systematic 
risk, regression (4) and (6) finds that the real estate loan exposure of IBs 
lowers its systematic risk. The findings concur with the previous section on Z-
. This section estimated the beta of 
each listed banks using their respective country stock indices and analyzes if 
level of real estate exposure can explain the fluctuations in their systematic 
risk. 
                                                          
15 Beta of each banks is estimated using the following market model, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑚,𝑡 where 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the daily return of bank’s stock i; 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is the daily return on the market in country m and 
𝛽 is the measure of systematic risk.  The most representative stock market indices are used as 
the market portfolios: the MSCI Total Return Market Index for UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait and Bahrain. 
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score. Hence in both instance, the real estate loan exposure of IBs is observed 
to have decreased the insolvency and systematic risk of IBs. This similarly 
suggest that although IBs have higher systematic and insolvency risk, its 
engagement in Shariah real estate loan exposure decreases its risk effects. 
Overall, coefficients on real estate equity also concur with the findings in Z-
score, albeit the effect of bank’s real estate equity on systematic risk may be 
minimal. Thus in regression (6) we see the effects of real estate equity 
diminishes suggesting that the main source of systematic risk in banks real 
estate exposure comes from the credit risk of its real estate loan portfolio. The 
control variables also yielded some expected results. For instance, banks 
which are more diversified, larger and less operationally efficient also see a 





Table 5: Alternative risk measure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
RE_Loan 0.006** 0.005** 0.012*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
RE_Invest 0.004** 0.003** 0.006** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)






Asset Diversity 0.004** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Assets 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost to Income Ratio 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005* 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Equity/Total Assets -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income Diversity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loan Loss Provisions -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -0.423*** -0.402*** -0.439*** -0.537*** -0.347** -0.533***
(0.151) (0.14) (0.149) (0.175) (0.138) (0.168)
Country Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 264 264 264 264 264 264
Adjusted R-Squared 0.219 0.214 0.224 0.248 0.227 0.243
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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CHAPTER 5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
5.1 
To further compare the effect of real estate exposure in different 
market conditions, this section re-estimate the regression models with two 
sub-periods corresponding with a crisis (2007-2009) and a non-crisis (2010-
2011) market. It is intuitive to expect during the crisis when the real estate 
market in the GCC is facing a down market that all banks with any form of 
real estate exposure would face greater instability effects. Hence, Table 6 
presents the results of the subperiod regressions. Regression (1) – (6) shows 
that across both sample periods, banks with real estate exposure have a 
downside effect on its insolvency risk. However the bigger coefficients of real 
estate coefficients in regression (1) – (3) suggest the effect is greater during 
the crisis than during the 2010-2011 periods. Also, the positive effect of IBs 
real estate exposure persists over all sample period. Regression (1) and (2) in 
Table 8 re-estimates using Beta as a risk measure. Similarly the results suggest 
asymmetric risk effects between IBs and CBs. This could suggest that due to 
the extra dependency of IBs business to the real estate sector, IBs are better 




In this section, the regressions in Table 7 are re-estimated using only 
IBs and CBs sample. Regression (1) – (3) uses only the sample of IBs while 
regression (3) – (4) uses only a sample of CBs. From (1) – (3) we observe that 




coefficients for IBs are all positive. On the contrary, regression (4) – (6) shows 
all the real estate coefficients of CBs are negative. Regression (3) and (4) in 
Table 8 also exhibits concurring evidence using Beta as a risk metric. These 
provide further evidence on the negative risk effects of real estate exposure for 
CBs and the positive effect of IBs Shariah real estate exposure. 
 
5.3 
A variety of stratification test is performed to test the sensitivity of the 
results to different levels of real estate exposure. Generally, the main findings 
that an asymmetric relationship between real estate exposure of Islamic and 
conventional banks against risk holds even when stratifying sample based on 
their real estate composition
Stratification 
16
                                                          
16 Blasko & Sinkey (2006) and Eisenbis & Kwast (1991) identified 40% real estate loans as 
the benchmark in identifying real estate banks (REB) from non-REB. Hence, this is used as a 
starting benchmark in this analysis.  
. First, in regressions (1) – (4) in Table 9, only 
banks with real estate loans less than 40% (20%) are included in the analysis. 
The positive relationship between Islamic banks exposure and risk still holds 
albeit the risk effects of real estate loans diminishes for banks with lesser than 
20% of real estate loans. In such banks, the risk effect of real estate equity 
plays a more significant role in risk contribution. Secondly, regressions (5) – 
(8) in Table 9, repeats the analysis using banks with less than 20% (10%) of 
real estate investments. The risk effects of real estate equity persist even for 
banks with less than 10% of real estate equity exposure. This highlights the 
inherent risk of diversifying into non-lending activity such as real estate 
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investing. Thirdly, across all specifications the asymmetric risk effects of 
Islamic banks real estate exposure persist.  
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Table 6: Subperiod regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007 to 2009 2007 to 2009 2007 to 2009 2010 to 2011 2010 to 2011 2010 to 2011
RE_Loan -0.799** -0.694** -0.614* -0.561*
(0.324) (0.321) (0.321) (0.327)
RE_Invest -0.441*** -0.304** -0.349 -0.115
(0.156) (0.139) (0.241) (0.214)
Islamic_Dummy -26.514*** -20.274*** -29.166*** -17.14** -12.904*** -18.131**
(7.413) (4.043) (7.888) (7.248) (2.97) (7.026)
Islamic_Dummy*RE_Loan 0.679** 0.627** 0.499 0.458
(0.31) (0.305) (0.334) (0.333)
Islamic_Dummy*RE_Invest 0.565*** 0.392** 0.437** 0.176
(0.17) (0.154) (0.213) (0.202)
Asset Diversity -0.109* -0.132** -0.12** -0.055 -0.047 -0.057
(0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.066) (0.054) (0.066)
Total Assets 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost to Income Ratio -0.011 0.054 0.02 -0.157* -0.211** -0.171*
(0.056) (0.063) (0.059) (0.086) (0.092) (0.092)
Equity/Total Assets 0.855*** 0.819*** 0.87*** 0.568*** 0.617*** 0.598***
(0.261) (0.265) (0.257) (0.199) (0.195) (0.202)
Income Diversity -0.015 0.010 -0.005 -0.023 -0.040 -0.026
(0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.038) (0.039) (0.04)
Loan Loss Provisions -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 38.229*** 24.502*** 37.04*** 40.549*** 33.37*** 40.338***
(10.023) (7.308) (10.274) (9.46) (7.085) (9.715)
Country Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 157 157 157 107 107 107
Adjusted R-Squared 0.297 0.269 0.302 0.366 0.327 0.355
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 7: Subsample regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IB IB IB CB CB CB
RE_Loan 0.041 0.042 -0.726*** -0.676***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.246) (0.245)
RE_Invest 0.08** 0.122*** -0.318** -0.138
(0.038) (0.031) (0.142) (0.126)
Asset Diversity -0.017 -0.009 -0.006 -0.205*** -0.198*** -0.21***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077)
Total Assets -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost to Income Ratio -0.067* -0.035 -0.066** -0.318*** -0.2 -0.297**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.117) (0.121) (0.119)
Equity/Total Assets 0.617*** 0.718*** 0.647*** 1.352*** 1.568*** 1.352***
(0.138) (0.141) (0.129) (0.406) (0.439) (0.407)
Income Diversity -0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.014 0.003 -0.012
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.041) (0.05) (0.041)
Loan Loss Provisions 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 11.13*** 8.387** 6.409 37.395*** 17.592** 37.018***
(4.17) (3.682) (4.027) (10.286) (8.701) (10.273)
Country Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 92 92 92 172 172 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.628 0.670 0.670 0.305 0.258 0.303
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 8: Beta & Real Estate Exposure 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2007 to 2009 2010 to 2011 IB CB
RE_Loan 0.007** 0.015** -0.006 0.008***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002)
RE_Invest 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.004*







Asset Diversity 0.003 0.01** 0.007** 0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000)
Total Assets 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost to Income Ratio 0.002 0.01** 0.007* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Equity/Total Assets -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 0.008*
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Income Diversity 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Loan Loss Provisions -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -0.133 -0.888** -0.354 -0.281**
(0.101) (0.44) (0.333) (0.123)
Country Control Y Y Y Y
Year Control Y Y Y Y
N 157 107 92 172
Adjusted R-Squared 0.280 0.293 0.141 0.458
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
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Table 9: Stratification regression 
 
RE Loan < 40% RE Loan <20% RE Equity < 20% RE Equity < 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Z-Score Beta Z-Score Beta Z-Score Beta Z-Score Beta
RE_Loan -0.661*** 0.011*** -0.57 0.007 -0.81*** 0.011*** -0.876*** 0.01***
(0.22) (0.003) (0.467) (0.003) (0.233) (0.003) (0.236) (0.003)
RE_Invest -0.219* 0.003 -3.003*** 0.018** -2.225*** 0.029*** -3.176*** 0.022**
(0.12) (0.002) (0.94) (0.008) (0.82) (0.009) (0.811) (0.01)
Islamic_Dummy -17.11*** 0.425*** -31.022*** 0.268** -26.616*** 0.429** -24.97*** 0.501**
(5.456) (0.156) (9.363) (0.109) (6.498) (0.193) (7.092) (0.218)
Islamic_Dummy*RE_Loan 0.32 -0.01** 1.278* -0.013 0.761*** -0.011** 0.739** -0.014**
(0.234) (0.004) (0.695) (0.007) (0.25) (0.005) (0.293) (0.006)
Islamic_Dummy*RE_Invest 0.22* -0.005 2.985*** -0.017* 2.034** -0.038*** 2.678** -0.017
(0.121) (0.003) (0.892) (0.008) (0.824) (0.013) (1.148) (0.025)
Intercept 41.557*** -0.491*** 56.177*** -0.226** 43.613*** -0.51*** 46.132*** -0.547***
(6.94) (0.158) (11.574) (0.113) (9.368) (0.158) (9.565) (0.186)
Firm Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Control Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 246 246 137 137 212 212 197 197
Adjusted R-Squared 0.354 0.230 0.312 0.477 0.345 0.201 0.348 0.195
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively
 48 
 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 
The real estate exposure of banking institutions is of great interest to 
policy makers because in most economy, the banking and real estate sector 
plays a crucial part in the economy. The invariable link and dependency 
between the two sectors would make either market susceptible to any crisis 
emanating from either market. Despite the well documented affinity of GCC 
conventional and Islamic banks towards real estate, no research outside the US 
market has directly tested the relationship between banks balance sheet real 
estate exposure and financial stability. This thesis seeks to provide new 
evidence on the effect of real estate exposure on banks financial stability. By 
hand collecting real estate balance sheet information from listed GCC banks 
and controlling for country and bank specific factors, this study is able to test 
this relationship in a multivariate setting. The two primary research questions 
guiding the empirical tests are: (1) Does bank’s real estate equity exposure 
affect its financial soundness, and (2) Do Islamic banks’ real estate exposure 
have different risk effects than the real estate exposure of conventional banks? 
Main Findings 
The estimation results from our panel models provide affirmative 
results for both research questions. The central finding in this thesis is that 
both real estate loan and equity exposure of conventional banks have a 
negative impact on its financial stability. As expected the effect is more 
apparent during the crisis period and persist post crisis. This suggest larger 
conventional banks that delve into real estate investing as a way of 
diversifying into non-lending activity ends up increasing its risk due to 
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potential difficulty in monitoring the real estate risk faced. On the contrary, all 
real estate exposure of Islamic banks has a positive effect on its stability. This 
could highlight the fact because Islamic banks are more heavily dependent on 
the real estate market for its business operations; it may have better ability to 
find lower risk real estate assets. In addition, the extra supervisory of Shariah 
board acts as an internal risk management tool to ensure the real estate 
transactions are compliant with the ethical Shariah ethos.  
The results also provide some evidence on the effect of real estate 
exposure on banks systematic risk. Because this thesis uses the universe 
sample of listed GCC banks and given their affinity to real estate, 
understanding the impact on systematic risk will be of utmost interest to 
investors and regulators. Results suggest that the real estate exposure of 
conventional banks in the GCC increases their systematic risk. This could 
emanate from the credit risk inherent in real estate loan portfolio and real 
estate market risk inherent in real estate investment portfolio. On the contrary, 
results for Islamic banks found lower effect on systematic risk. This may 
suggest that the Shariah real estate assets in which Islamic banks finances and 
invests have lower risk effects.  
 
6.2 
Uncovering the effect of banks real estate exposure on its financial 
stability has many important implications for the different stakeholders. 
Firstly, conventional bank managers diversifying into real estate investing as a 
non-lending activity has to increase their monitoring. As per Laeven & Levine 
Implications & Limitations 
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(2007), increased diversity of activity may increase the moral hazard due to 
the difficulty in monitoring. The unique real estate risk inherent in real estate 
investment portfolio may require banks to set up real estate subsidiaries or 
investing in real estate mutual funds for added risk due diligence. Directly 
investing in real estate may carry risks which conventional bank managers 
may not have the expertise to handle. Secondly, regulators mulling the 
prospect of introducing Islamic finance intermediary into their shores have to 
understand the unique dependency of IBs and the real estate market. While 
empirical test do not suggest any immediate systematic risk effects, however 
precautions has to be observe to ensure IBs do not become over exposed. A 
key factor for that would be the development of the Sukuk market. Lastly, 
investors of GCC banking stocks have to monitor their portfolios more closely 
due to the inherent systematic risk of banks real estate exposure.  
While this research is carried out at the aggregate level, however it 
should be noted that the findings is only extended towards listed banks. In the 
GCC banking market, most banks are not listed and some of their real estate 
disclosures are not available. Though this study analyzes the major players in 
the GCC banking market, consequently the results should be examined with 
this limitation in mind. In addition, the real estate equity amount in the study 
maybe under stated because it only contains direct property investments. In the 
balance sheet of GCC banks, it is common for some banks to invest in 
intermediaries or associates who may be real estate operating companies or 
real estate mutual funds. Hence, in actual fact, the real estate equity proxy is 
understated because this study is not able to account for these equity positions 
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in all banks. Nonetheless the direct real estate investment amount is 
pronounced enough to provide the evidence in this study.     
 
6.3 
While this thesis has comprehensively tested the real estate exposure of 
banks on its financial stability using GCC banks, there is still room for further 
works.  Because the risk effects of banks real estate exposure has been 
established, future work should look to explore the behavioral determinants of 
bank’s decision to increase/decrease their real estate loan portfolio. Herring & 
Watcher (1999) suggested banks increased real estate lending because of its 
perceived profitability but also attributed it to some elements of myopic 
elements. Thus far no empirical test has been done to support her theoretical 
work. On the Islamic finance front, the effect of an immature Sukuk market 
can be seen by Islamic banks dominating their investment portfolio with 
volatile real estate assets. Hence, a purview into the Sukuk market trends over 
the last decade can give a greater look if in recent years, has Islamic banks 
been more involved in Sukuk issuance vis-à-vis sovereigns. Documenting the 
characteristics of Sukuk issuers and the bond characteristics can give a better 
outlook for the industry and the risk management prospects of Islamic banks. 
Future Work 





Appendix 1: Notes on variables and data sources 
Variable Description Data sources
Z-score BankScope, author's calculation
ROA Return on assets BankScope
Capital ratio Ratio of equity to total assets BankScope, author's calculation
stdROA Standard deviation of ROA BankScope, author's calculation
RE Loan Notes of financial statement, author's calculation
RE Invest BankScope, author's calculation
Assets Total assets in thousand USD BankScope
Loan loss provision Loan loss provisions in thousands USD BankScope
Cost-income ratio Ratio of overhead cost to total revenue BankScope
Asset diversity 1-[(Net loans-Other earning assets)/Total earning assets] Laeven & Levine (2007)
Income diversity 1-[(Net interest income-Other operating income)/Total operating income] Laeven & Levine (2007)
Islamic Bank Based on Zawya classification
Country control Author
Time control Author
Dummy variable that takes the value of one for each country Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia (exclude UAE) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one for each year from 2007 to 2010 
(exclude 2011)
Ratio of sum of equity capital to total assets and ROA to standard deviation of ROA
Real estate loan concentration: amount of real estate and construction loans as a 
fraction of total credit loan portfolio
Real estate investment concentration: amount of real estate investment as fraction of 
total investment portfolio




Appendix 2: Sample of listed GCC banks 
 
Bank Name Country Status
Ahli United Bank Bahrain Conventional
Al Salam Bank Bahrain Bahrain Islamic
Arab Banking Corporation Bahrain Conventional
Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain Islamic
BBK Bahrain Conventional
Gulf Finance House Bahrain Islamic
Khaleeji Commercial Bank Bahrain Islamic
National Bank of Bahrain Bahrain Conventional
Ahli United Bank - Kuwait Kuwait Islamic
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait Kuwait Conventional
Boubyan Bank Kuwait Islamic
Burgan Bank Kuwait Conventional
Commercial Bank of Kuwait Kuwait Conventional
Gulf Bank Kuwait Conventional
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait Islamic
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait Islamic
National Bank of Kuwait Kuwait Conventional
Ahli Bank Qatar Conventional
Al Khalij Commercial Bank Qatar Conventional
Doha Bank Qatar Conventional
Masraf Al Rayan Qatar Islamic
Qatar International Islamic Bank Qatar Islamic
Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar Islamic
Qatar National Bank Qatar Conventional
The Commercial Bank of Qatar Qatar Conventional
Al Rajhi Saudi Arabia Islamic
Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia Islamic
Arab National Bank Saudi Arabia Conventional
Bank AlBilad Saudi Arabia Islamic
Bank AlJazira Saudi Arabia Islamic
Banque Saudi Fransi Saudi Arabia Conventional
Riyad Bank Saudi Arabia Conventional
SABB Saudi Arabia Conventional
Samba Financial Group Saudi Arabia Conventional
Saudi Hollandi Bank Saudi Arabia Conventional
The Saudi Investment Bank Saudi Arabia Conventional
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UAE Conventional
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE Islamic
Bank of Sharjah UAE Conventional
Commercial Bank International UAE Conventional
Commercial Bank of Dubai UAE Conventional
Dubai Islamic Bank UAE Islamic
Emirates Islamic Bank UAE Islamic
Emirates NBD UAE Conventional
First Gulf Bank UAE Conventional
Investbank UAE Conventional
Mashreqbank UAE Conventional
National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE Conventional
National Bank of Fujairah UAE Conventional
National Bank of Ras Al Khaimah UAE Conventional
National Bank of Umm Al Qaiwain UAE Conventional
Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE Islamic
Union National Bank UAE Conventional
United Arab Bank UAE Conventional
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